Abstract. In this paper we attempt to provide a conceptual framework which can help inform our analysis and understanding of current transformations taking place within the welfare state. We argue that the French school of regulationist literature, though able to provide a broad frame of reference for analysing contemporary shifts in economy and society, needs to be supplemented by an analysis which focuses on the racialised and gendered character of the welfare state. In the paper the ways in which the 'universal' welfare state has operated to exclude minorities and marginalised groups are charted, and we argue that in practice the Fordist mode of social regulation (MSR) operating in Britain generated a hierarchy of oppression. This hierarchy was constituted through the relations of class, race, and gender, and we show how these are currently being redefined as the British state seeks to mediate the crisis tendencies inherent in the Fordist MSR.
However, whether the focus is on what we are moving to, or what we have moved away from, few commentators now doubt that the last fifteen years have witnessed significant shifts in the structure and content of the welfare state. Indeed, the current Secretary of State for Social Security, Peter Lilley, announced at the Conservative Party Conference of 1993 that the British Government now wishes to transcend the welfare state in order to establish a so-called 'welfare society', in which large sections of the population will be expected to provide for their own welfare needs through private insurance. Only a small proportion of the 'deserving' poor would be protected by a minimal state safety net. This latest proposal comes at the end of a whole series of incremental changes in welfare policy and thinking, covering individual policy areas such as housing, education, and health, which have significantly shifted the contours of the welfare state. In many areas, privatised delivery based on the ability to pay is increasingly replacing state provision based on notions of need. In addition, structural adjustments have been made to the welfare state as a whole, via taxation and public spending policies which are aimed at reducing the overall role of the public sector.
These policy changes have been informed by, and legitimated through, ideological attacks on the form and function of the welfare state. Neoliberal and neoconservative thinkers have argued respectively that the welfare state has had deleterious effects on the strength and 'competitiveness' of the British economy, and has undermined supposedly traditional forms of social institutions such as the nuclear family. In contrast to this position, those opposed to the reforms and reductions in the scope of the welfare state have continued to voice their support for the idea of a universal and inclusive welfare system. However, though the idea of the welfare state remains powerful, its operations in practice have been problematised by a number of authors from across the political spectrum, and not just by those on the Right (Williams, 1989) . The 400-page report of the Borrie Commission on Social Justice is only the most recent example of such rethinking by the Left (CSJ, 1994) . The content of these critiques, undertaken from a variety of different positions, helps to shed some light on the nature of the postwar welfare state.
Initially, from a Left perspective, Marxist theorists argued that the welfare state was not a straightforward victory for labour over capital but, on the contrary, provided a mechanism by which capital accumulation could be assisted through the socialisation of the costs of reproducing labour power and the mitigation of class conflict. This position is echoed in some versions of regulation theory, which we will consider in more detail below. More recently, feminist and antiracist writers have demonstrated the sexist and racist character of the welfare state, and it is these criticisms which form the basis of much of our subsequent argument. For example, Pateman (1988) shows how the nature of the welfare state is based on the assumptions that women are dependent on male wage earners, and that women are the appropriate providers of caring and welfare services (see also Wilson, 1977) . Williams (1989, page 87) notes that, although there is an increasing amount of work on race, racism, and the welfare state, this has not yet coalesced to form a distinct antiracist critique in the same way as the feminist critiques. Nonetheless we can discern a pervasive argument in most accounts to the effect that groups defined as ethnic minorities face a double bind in relation to the welfare state. As a result of racism in society, these groups are systematically found in less privileged social and economic positions, thereby increasing their dependence on the welfare state. At the same time, the welfare state treats them in a systematically less favourable way than their white counterparts (see also Pierson, 1991 , pages 79-92).
In Britain, the services provided by the welfare state have been to a large degree delivered by local state institutions. The practices of local government, therefore, are also implicated by these critiques. Moreover, in addition to its status as service provider, local government in Britain also fulfils a representative function and has thus been a key site for local political struggles. Antiracist and feminist groups both have campaigned for changes in the practice of the institutions of local government, and at the same time (and in particular places) have used them as a platform for their political struggles. This has been in part because there has been slightly greater access to political institutions at the local level than at the central, and in part because the immediate political concerns of the new social movements have often focused on issues which are the responsibility of the local state. In each case, these struggles, along with the critiques which informed them and flowed from them, have brought into sharp focus the racialised and gendered character of the institutions and practices of the welfare state. As we will suggest in more detail below, this character constantly needs to be borne in mind when analysing the contemporary transition in welfare provision.
Regulation theory and the welfare state
One recently influential interpretation of the postwar welfare state, and of the role of local government within it, has drawn on regulation theory. This view sees the welfare state as part of the mode of social regulation of the postwar economic boom. According to regulation theory, a sustained period of economic growth, such as that which occurred in the 1950s and 1960s in Britain, presupposes a network of social, cultural, and political institutions and practices which support the processes of capital accumulation involved. When successful in promoting economic development, albeit temporarily, such a network is referred to as a mode of social regulation (MSR). We will refer to the MSR associated with the postwar phase of economic growth as 'Fordism' (Jessop, 1992) . Given the growing diversity of the regulation approach, it is important to enter a few caveats. An MSR is not, in our view, a fully coherent, static, and homogeneous social structure. On the contrary, it is unevenly developed over space and, as a dynamic and contradictory phenomenon, is always prone to development, crisis, and transformation. Moreover, our use of the term Fordism to refer to the postwar MSR does not imply that another MSR (labeled, say, 'post-Fordism') will inevitably follow (Goodwin and Painter, 1993) . It certainly does not imply that such a new MSR is actually formed at present, and hence we speak throughout the paper of a stage of transition and crisis, rather than of a new MSR. Nor does it imply that the labour process in the state's production of goods and services involved mass production (Painter, 1991) . Last, it should be pointed out that the regulatory effects of an MSR do not in themselves explain how and why the components of the MSR emerged and developed initially. To avoid functionalism, the emergence and specific form of an MSR must be explained historically in terms of the political and social struggles involved in its development. The existence of social phenomena, including the welfare state, cannot be explained by their (frequently unintended) consequences.
Our current research project is the examination of the consequences of the failure of the Fordist MSR for local government, and the responses of the state at the central and local levels to those consequences (Goodwin and Painter, 1993) . We are thus identifying those elements of state activity at the local level, which were a part of the dynamic network of institutions and practices that defined the Fordist MSR; considering the impact of the failure of Fordism on those elements; and charting the extent and scope of new forms of local governance. The conceptual starting point for this research, therefore, must be an adequate characterisation of the Fordist MSR and of the role of local government therein; hence our interest in tracing the shape and form of the Fordist welfare state, as a prelude to analysing its transition.
The conventional regulationist account of Fordism, and of the role of the welfare state within a Fordist MSR, has focused almost exclusively on its class character, viewing Fordism in some senses as the outcome of class compromise. In such accounts the welfare state is seen as a key element anchoring the postwar political settlement. In the words of Moulaert and Swyngedouw: "This phase of rapid and intensive accumulation (generally known as the Fordist accumulation regime), was based on mass production in the industrial realm, and on heavy regulatory state intervention resulting in the 'welfare state' in the political realm" (1989, page 331). Put briefly, the argument is as follows. The working class struggled for, and won, considerable improvements in welfare provision, including social security against unemployment and the state provision of housing, health care, education, and pensions. In addition, the institutionalisation of collective bargaining allowed regular real-term wage increases in exchange for a degree of productivity increase through organisational and technical change and good labour relations. At the same time these real benefits for the working class made possible the further expansion of capital accumulation. Productivity increases allowed output growth, and employment growth helped to finance the welfare state via increased income from taxation. The market for the increased output was guaranteed by steady wage increases on the one hand and by a minimum-consumption norm underwritten by the state's social security system and social wage on the other. A large part of the costs of reproducing labour power was socialised in the state, thereby removing from private capital the responsibility for providing goods and services from which it was not easy to generate continued productivity increases, and which therefore made only a limited contribution, if any, to the process of accumulation. In political terms, the bipartisan welfare state was a key site where the consensual politics of social democracy could be actively constructed and experienced, both locally and centrally. According to Moulaert and Swyngedouw, the Keynesian state can be seen as "the institutional balance wheel of Fordist regulation" (1989, page 333). As a major component of the Keynesian state, local government thus played a central role both in the economic and in the political relations of the Fordist MSR.
In our view this conventional account, although offering a broad frame of reference, is insufficient. There can be a tendency for the settled nature of the 'settlement' to be stressed, when in reality the political and economic compromise that was reached depended upon the uneasy, and often unsuccessful, containment of numerous tensions and contradictions. Moreover, because it is based only on a class analysis, it fails to consider the gendered and racialised character of Fordism. Without an account of the specifically sexist and racist nature of Fordism it is impossible to understand how Fordism operated as an MSR and, more crucially, how this is now being transformed. In addition, erasing gender and race from the account also leads to a misunderstanding of the class relations of Fordism, as these depend on, and are closely related to, its gendered and racialised character. In the rest of the paper, therefore, we seek to present a preliminary discussion of the gender, race, and class relations of the Fordist MSR, and of its breakdown. Where appropriate, we link our account to the institutions and practices of the local welfare state as the substantive object of our research.
3 Gender, race, and class in the Fordist mode of social regulation In attempting to analyse the role played in stabilising an MSR by crucial sets of relations other than class, we need not actually depart too far from some of the founding works in the regulationist field. Aglietta, for example, in his pioneering text A Theory of Capitalist Regulation speaks of regulation theory as the "study of the transformation of social relations as it creates new forms that are both economic and non-economic" (1979, page 16) , and although he concentrates on the first form, there is no conceptual reason why we should not redress the balance by emphasising the second. Indeed, the methodology of regulation theory makes no assumptions about which sets of social relations will be important in any given mode of regulation. For, in addition to economic relations, an MSR can in principle, and indeed does in practice, consist of a whole variety of social, political, and cultural relations, such as those of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, religion, and morality. The only requirement that must be satisfied for a mode of regulation to exist is that its various components should interact in such a way as to 'regulate', at least temporarily, the contradictions of capitalism. To state this is to say nothing about the detailed nature of these components. This remains an empirical question to be uncovered through substantive concrete research.
The exact nature of the interaction between three major sets of social relationsclass, gender, and race-has been widely debated, largely outside the regulationist literature. Key concerns include: whether these three sets of social relations can be seen as analytically distinct, or are they completely intertwined, forming as it were a single system of racist patriarchal capitalism (Ackers, 1989; Crompton and Mann, 1986; Walby, 1989) ? Whatever view is taken of the interrelations of class, race, and gender at the higher levels of abstraction, it is clear that at the more concrete, historical level of a MSR the answer must be that the social relations of class, race, and gender are interdependent and mutually constituting. This means that, although we cannot specify at an abstract level the precise ways in which different sets of social relations will combine, at the concrete level of the Fordist MSR in postwar Britain we are indeed able to trace the articulation of race, gender, and class. Our argument is illustrated from the British case, but concrete research elsewhere would reveal the ways in which these sets of social relations are articulated differently, with different consequences, in other countries. In Sweden, for instance, we might find a Fordist MSR with fewer gender inequalities than in Britain, and in the USA we may uncover a Fordism which relied much more on the exploitation of racial and ethnic differences. Exactly which axes of division will be opened up by a Fordist MSR will be historically and spatially contingent, as will be their specific articulation. Thus, although Fordism as an abstract concept is not inherently gendered or racialised, we can say that in the concrete case of postwar Britain, a nonsexist, nonracist Fordist MSR certainly would be a contradiction in terms.
Despite this, and the emergence of feminist and antiracist critiques of the welfare state, regulation theorists have made little, if any, attempt to specify the gendered and racialised character of the Fordist MSR. We feel this is problematic, because the Fordist MSR was constituted in part through specific, and in principle specifiable, patterns of gender and race, as well as class, relations. To some extent these patterns contributed to the dynamic regulatory effects of Fordism; that is to say, they helped to promote and sustain economic growth. However, to some extent the gender and race relations of Fordism also helped to undermine its coherence, and contributed to the contradictions which eventually led to its breakdown. It should be noted that, just as the nature of Fordism was different in different countries (Peck and Tickell, 1994) , the pattern and articulation of class, gender, and race relations also varied significantly between different national economies, although there were important global connections. Our concern here is with the British case.
3.1 Gender, Fordism, and the welfare state There have been remarkably few feminist commentaries on regulation theory. One exception is Jenson's brief review (1990) of how her regulationist account of Canada's political economy, and her concept of 'permeable Fordism', were informed by and depended on her feminist politics. Another is McDowell's discussion (1991) of the 'new gender order of post-Fordism'. Both make valuable contributions to our arguments. From Jenson, we can take the critique of "the Regulation approach for proceeding as if Fordism ... depend(s) primarily on the mobilization of a primary contradiction and single collective identity, around the practices of labour based institutions" (1990, pages 66-67) . McDowell extends this critique by making explicit the importance of gender relations under Fordism, in emphasising that the "old Fordist compact" was primarily one "between capital, men and the state" (1991, page 412). A further part of her argument is to point out that this compact is now breaking down, not solely for class reasons, but partly as a result of increased reliance on women's labour both at home and at work.
For now, using other feminist critiques of the welfare state (see Williams, 1989 for a summary), we can draw out the idea that, ideologically and culturally, Fordism depended upon the notion of the nuclear family as the norm and the 'family wage' as the basis for organised collective bargaining. This was assumed to be the foundation of mass consumption, particularly of housing, cars, and consumer goods. This consumption was subsidised by the state through the social wage in ways which also took the nuclear family as the norm. Before the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, the state attempted to justify lower wages for those women who were in employment on the grounds that their earnings were only a supplement to the family income, as so-called 'pin money'. Many of these assumptions overstated the extent to which the economy really was dominated by full-time male 'breadwinners', but this disjuncture between rhetoric and reality was a key part of the Fordist MSR. It enabled the formal consolidation of trade union power in those manual maledominated unions, and helped to legitimise segmentation of the workforce along gender lines. Moreover, capital literally could not afford to provide high wages and real wage increases for all, and the segmentation of the labour market on gender and racial lines-supported by the appropriate political and discursive strategiesprovided a way of maintaining downward pressure on wages in occupations where productivity gains through mechanisation were difficult to achieve. This occurred most notably in the labour-intensive service sector and in the welfare state-both sectors in which women and black workers were disproportionately represented.
Such a situation was not accidental. Indeed, the Beveridge Report, the cornerstone of Britain's emergent welfare state, is nothing if not explicit about the gendered nature of the compromise it was initiating.
"In any measure of social policy ... the great majority of married women must be regarded as occupied on work which is vital though unpaid, without which their husbands could not do their paid work and without which the nation could not continue. In accord with the facts the plan for Social Security treats married women as a special insurance class of occupied persons and treats man and wife as a team ... That attitude of the housewife to gainful employment outside the home is not, and should not be, the same as that of the single women. She has other duties ... Taken as a whole the plan ... puts a premium on marriage in place of penalising it" (Beveridge, quoted in Clarke et al, 1987, page 101).
As we have noted, a key feature of Fordism was the state's subsidy of the costs of reproducing labour power through the provision of the social wage in various forms. This socialisation of reproduction under Fordism, however, was always partial. As Beveridge makes clear, the state's subsidy was itself always intended to be subsidised, through the unpaid domestic labour of (married) women. The "premium on marriage" stressed by the Beveridge Report was actually a convenient shorthand for the continuation of all sorts of gender inequalities, both at home and at work. The historical emergence of a separate sphere of home life has been documented in a range of literature (see, for example, Little et al, 1988; Mackenzie and Rose, 1983) , which stresses the extent to which the 'domestic economy' was fundamental in the reproduction of labour power. Drawing on this literature, we can make the point that the emergent welfare state did not relieve women of domestic responsibility, but rather reinscribed patterns of gender discrimination in new ways. Often these new ways were linked to women's increasing participation in the labour force, sometimes on a part-time basis so as to fit in with their domestic responsibilities. Since its inception, the welfare state has been a major employer of women, many working at the point-of-service delivery in local government. State employment practices perpetuated the assumption that women were carers and should thus take prime responsibility for reproduction in its broadest sense. Hence, the gendering of employment in the state and local state tends to mirror the gender divisions of the home. As Williams points out:
"The post-war expansion of the welfare state reveals this ... process ... markedly. Whilst women have provided the socialised forms of care they have done so consistently in the lower paid grades of the welfare state. What highlights the particularly exploitative nature of women's work is not simply that in many cases employers use the cleaning, cooking and caring skills that women have developed in their homes and label it as low paid unskilled work, but also that so much of this work is part-time and therefore low paid. Much of this work is seen as women's work engaging women's skills and ... has been constructed as part-time and therefore low paid to fit in with domestic commitments. Men's work in equivalent areas, such as ambulance men and hospital porters also requires full-time cover but is organised as full-time shift work" (1989, pages 181-182). The gendering of much of the employment within the welfare state^ as 'women's work' is reflected in the makeup of the labour force. Women make up 75% of the manual labour force in local authority employment (Coyle, 1985, page 21) and constitute 75% of the total Health Service workforce (Williams, 1989, page 191) . Put simply, if somewhat crudely, women have been constructed within the welfare state as a source of cheap, flexible, and relatively low-paid labour. Their experience as such has, over much of the postwar period, undoubtedly helped both to limit the rising costs of welfare and to manage variable and flexible demand for welfare provision.
Women also experience inequality as consumers of the welfare state, which insists on applying gender-neutral rules to social and economic processes that are themselves strongly gender segregated. Thus, because women are more likely to have breaks in employment than men, and to work part-time and earn low wages, many will forfeit their right to national insurance benefits, relying instead on more vulnerable means-tested benefits (Oppenheim, 1990, pages 95-96) . So although benefits are technically gender neutral, they are modeled on male patterns of labour-force participation, and women are at a disadvantage because they work shorter and more irregular hours (Pierson, 1991, page 78) . Hence, whether we are talking about women as workers, as consumers, or as ideological lynchpins of the 'family', it is hard to escape the logic of Rose, who views the development of the welfare state as "an accommodation between capital and a male-dominated labour movement (which) reached its maturity in the post-war years ... this particular achievement which offered substantial gains for the working class, did so none the less at the price of the continued subordination and dependency of women" (quoted in Williams, 1989 , page 63).
3.2 Race, Fordism, and the welfare state There is, of course, another section of the community, which has felt continuing subordination and dependency throughout the long boom of the Fordist period. The development of the welfare state has also been subsidised and serviced by black labour, originally largely drawn from Britain's ex-colonies. Again, the Beveridge Report was quite explicit in pointing to the racialised nature of the settlement it was helping to shape when it maintained that: "... In the next thirty years housewives as mothers have vital work to do in ensuring the adequate continuance of the British Race and British Ideals in the World" (quoted in Clarke et al, 1987, page 101) . In economic and political, as well as cultural, terms the accommodation reached between capital, male labour, and the state was as racialised as it was gendered. It was an essentially 'white' compromise which paid little heed to the needs and aspirations of ethnic minorities, preferring instead to protect the position of the established skilled working class.
Immigration, like female employment, has served as a source of cheap and flexible labour in the welfare state-a labour-intensive area of the economy particularly resistant to productivity gains through technical change and automation. Summing up the debate on immigration and employment, Pierson concludes that "The predominant economic view, and certainly the motivation of those welfare states which encouraged migration in the 1950s and 1960s was that the importation of migrant workers would improve circumstances for capital accumulation ... Under these circumstances [of near full employment] many of the Western European welfare states turned to migrants as a source of comparatively cheap labour to fill unskilled positions" (1991, page 35). Although much of the critical work on race and racism in the postwar United Kingdom has concentrated on employment practices and labour migration, little explicit attention has been given to determining the impact of black labour on the Fordist MSR in this period. We can say, however, that the specific recruitment of ex-colonial labour to work in the welfare state, especially in the NHS and London Transport (who advertised vacancies directly in the West Indies), facilitated the successful expansion of these services by keeping wages to a minimum-a minimum which would have been contested by an increasingly unionised white working class (although ironically protest from immigrant labour would later prove to be crucial in helping to undermine the Fordist settlement).
We can add that such recruitment facilitated the upward movement of white labour into better paid and higher skilled jobs, thus reinforcing the political, cultural, and economic segregation of the postwar workforce. This in turn enabled the sharper definition of the economic and political position of the white skilled male trade unionist, and allowed such groups to take their place as the official representatives of the labour movement in the Fordist settlement (Layton-Henry, 1984; Mama, 1992; Parmar, 1982) . Such segregation was partly maintained by employers, and partly through the fact that the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in particular, and the labour movement in general, developed a negative and defensive reaction to immigration, so facilitating the continued marginalisation of black workers. Phizacklea and Miles conclude that, "Those trade unionists placed at the heart of the collaborative machinery of government and in a position of leadership within the trade union movement were amongst the earliest advocates of racist immigration controls" (1992, page 35).
Such a movement towards immigration controls grew steadily over the postwar period, reaching a peak in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This can be seen as a reaction by segments of the white population to the perceived threat they felt to their own rising patterns of social and private consumption. Ben-Tovim and Gabriel (1982, page 149) point out how the Notting Hill and Nottingham 'race riots' of 1958 can be seen at once as a measure, and partial cause, of the changing popular opinion concerning immigration controls. They go on to note that:
"The riots were used to support a growing articulation of the view that social problems of housing, health and social services were seriously exacerbated by the presence of West Indian immigrants ... Thus, the real material conditions and problems of the working class were being connected in a simplistic causal chain with an identifiable out-group ... the articulation of large-scale Commonwealth immigration as a threat to working class job security and prospects, and in respect of 'its' welfare state could therefore find sympathetic reverberations amongst the working class, particularly at a time of declining prosperity". In this way, the integrity of the 'virtuous circle' between production and consumption, central to the Fordist settlement (Aglietta, 1979) , was perceived as being under threat and requiring local and national state action to protect it. The racialised character of the postwar settlement thus helped to fix not only the economic boundaries, but also the social, political, and cultural parameters of Fordism as a mode of social regulation. The Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 gave legal force to these parameters, and by extending immigration controls attempted to address the increasing pressures both on welfare provision and on employment levels. As such it can be seen as an early, and crude, response to the impending crisis of Fordism, and as an initial attempt to introduce racial criteria into the specification of a core and periphery labour force.
As we can see, the discrimination felt by ethnic minorities, both as providers and as users of welfare services, in many regards parallels that felt by women. However, in terms of noncontributory benefits, the disadvantages felt by women are compounded by residence qualifications. Thus, severe-disablement allowance, attendance allowance, mobility allowance, child benefit, widow's benefit, and category C and D pensions all require residential qualifications before they can be fully claimed, which disadvantages immigrant groups. However, the link between benefits and immigration is most explicit in the means-tested part of the social security system. As Oppenheim points out (1990, page 89), claiming income support, family credit, or even access to housing under the homeless legislation can endanger the chances of bringing the rest of one's family to the United Kingdom, or create problems for the claimant themselves or their sponsor. The 1971 Immigration Act meant that the wives and children of Commonwealth citizens could only enter the country if a sponsor could support and accommodate them "without recourse to public funds", defined clearly for the first time in 1985 to include the three major means-tested benefits referred to above. Thus people who may have worked and paid taxes here for decades, are only allowed to be joined by their families on condition that they do not claim benefits for them or turn to the welfare state for accommodation. More surreptitiously perhaps, the increasing frequency of passport checks on black claimants at benefit offices-regardless of whether they were born in the United Kingdom-helps to create a climate of opinion which views welfare as the entitlement of white Britons rather than of black 'outsiders' (Oppenheim, 1990) .
For all these reasons, it is difficult to disagree with Cohen when he proposes that "welfarism is intimately linked to immigration control, and cannot be understood other than as a construct of the basest nationalism" ( , page 92, quoted in Williams, 1989 . Moreover, the discriminatory nature of the wider economic and social structures of our society, along with demographic structure, means that black people, like women, are more dependent on the welfare state than are white men. However, access to welfare services is itself often discriminatory, resulting in differential access to, and achievement in, a range of welfare services (on the fields of housing and education see Ginsburg, 1992; Jacobs, 1985; Williams, 1989) .
The discriminatory nature of the welfare state is perhaps most clearly felt by black women. As citizens and consumers they have experienced most keenly the fact that "healthcare, education, housing, social security and social services have been differentially delivered" (Mama, 1992, page 86 ). However, we should see such differential provision as crucial to the success of the postwar welfare state. The distribution of the supposed 'benefits' of the Fordist MSR was skewed in a racist and a sexist way. Insofar as Fordism was the accommodation of a class compromise, it benefited only certain sections of the working class, particularly skilled white men. Its racialised and gendered character generated a hierarchy of oppression. This was not incidental to the workings of Fordism, but was central to its operation. The success of Fordism in Britain depended upon its social divisions. And within the Fordist MSR, the operations of the welfare state helped to shape and sustain these divisions. As Mama puts it:
"The history of the development of welfare and the circumscribed nature of access to it demonstrates that provision has always been constituted along social divisions. Class, race and gender discrimination have often operated through notions and judgements about who are 'really deserving' and who are 'undeserving'. In short, the welfare state has never existed universally for the public, but has operated to exclude minorities and uphold dominant ideologies about the family, motherhood and sexuality, often behaving punitively and coercively towards ... marginalised groups through various ideological mechanisms and administrative practices" (1992, page 86). However, the gender, class, and racial order of Fordism also contributed to its contradictions and to its current breakdown. Domination and power of any sort generate resistance, and the development of new social, political, and cultural movements, partially as a product of Fordism's oppressions, were instrumental in its decline. It is to these issues that we now turn, to see if they carry any implications for our understanding of the current transformation in welfare provision, especially at the local level.
4 Gender, race, and class in the breakdown of Fordism: some implications for an analysis of the current transition The processes of gender and racial domination inherent in the Fordist MSR prompted responses from women and from those defined as ethnic minorities. In both cases, the Fordist concentration of power in the hands of white men was challenged in a variety of arenas. For example, the confinement of most women and black people to lower paid, lower skilled employment, though essential in defining the economic and political parameters of Fordist expansion, was challenged by an increasingly vocal set of social movements focused on labour-market issues. One of the seven specific demands formulated by the women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s was for equal opportunity in employment and education (Women and Geography Study Group, 1984) , and black workers' movements began to organise inside the labour movement both for higher wages and for access to those jobs 'reserved' for white workers (Phizacklea and Miles, 1992) . Indeed, the resistance of black workers in disputes such as Red Scar in Preston, Mansfield Mills in Loughborough, Jaffe and Malmic Lace in Nottingham, Standard Telephone and Cables in Southgate, Imperial Typewriters in Leicester, Grunwick in West London, Chix Sweets in Slough, and Fritters in North London (Brah, 1992; Phizacklea and Miles, 1992) forced the TUC to mount an antifacist campaign and press all affiliated unions to negotiate equal-opportunities policies.
Such moves, of course, challenged the traditional political structures of the Fordist MSR as well as the profitability of the capitals involved. The last four disputes were also notable as they were largely organised and led by black women, and highlighted the crucial role of community as well as workplace solidarity. As Williams (1989, page 198 ) points out, "it was from the black communities that financial and organisational support was forthcoming, when the trade unions and welfare agencies failed". Crucial to our argument is the fact that the consciousness and political organisation gained through these struggles were often carried over into other fields. Gilroy (1987, page 37) suggests that there was a continuity of protest from the 1981 urban riots to the Health Service strike which followed them, and he goes on to point out that class antagonisms of black people are often directly expressed in and through community struggles over state services. Williams (1989, page 194) notes how women's struggles in a variety of fields, from the right to determine their own fertility to the freedom from violent and oppressive relationships, all challenge the form, nature, and objectives of welfare policy. In so doing they placed economic and political strains on the heavily contested resources of the Fordist economy. The local welfare state often bore the brunt of these strains, as it struggled to cope with increasing demands on a range of services-at a time of reduced financial support (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988) . Local government was used as a means for mitigating, moderating, and sometimes meeting the challenges posed by new political forces. Increasingly, however, the political consensus developed within Fordism was stretched to the limits by these attempts to accommodate new demands. At a time of financial stringency, local authorities were forced to balance competing demands from old and new constituencies-often pleasing nobody as a consequence.
To document these struggles is not to suggest that the crisis of Fordism can be reduced to concerns with race and gender. The crisis tendencies inherent within Fordism are indeed wide ranging (Jessop, 1993) , and involve issues such as the ineffectiveness of national economic management in a global financial economy, and the difficulty of extending both mass production and mass consumption, as well as a growing fiscal crisis of the state. The point is that these tendencies will be articulated differently in different countries, with the crucial factor being the particular ways in which they come together and find political, social, and cultural expression. It is also the case that an MSR is highly dynamic, and that its concrete form constantly changes in response to numerous economic, social, and political pressures. It is quite possible that something which helps regulation at some stage-such as the use of immigrant labour-becomes dysfunctional at a later point. The welfare state itself, in its mass social democratic form, could also be seen in this light. In Britain, the issues of race and gender have been highly visible at a political and cultural level, and perhaps because of this, the state has had to confront the implications and effects of its earlier interventions in these areas. This gives a particular twist to the ways in which the British state has attempted to cope with the crisis tendencies of Fordism-in other countries, with different articulations of these tendencies, the responses will vary accordingly.
One widespread attempt at mollifying and incorporating the new demands can be witnessed through the rise of equal-opportunity policies. In the mid-1970s, at a time when the contradictions of Fordism were beginning to be widely felt, we saw overt signs of the depth of the political crisis. The Equal Pay Act of 1970, the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, and the Race Relations Act of 1976, followed by the establishment of the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Commission for Racial Equality, were all attempts to concede and contain the new political forces of gender and race. These have, however, proved largely ineffective. The legislation on gender equality has had to be bolstered by the Equal Treatment Directives of the European Commission to give it practical effect, and racial discrimination and violence against ethnic minorities continues seemingly unabated. However, in response to continued struggles at local level at the beginning of the 1980s, including the inner-city riots, several local authorities began to introduce more targetted equality policies, covering disabled people, and gays and lesbians, as well as women and ethnic minorities. Together with critiques of existing welfare delivery, these helped to crystallise and legitimate new demands and strategies by welfare users. However, although these have offered a focus for the demands of women and black people in relation to the welfare state, any positive effects they may have had have been more than offset by the continued oppression felt as a result of recent welfare state restructuring, which we will now outline.
In the context of two decades of increasing poverty and unemployment from the mid-1970s, which have worsened the general material conditions that exacerbate racial and gender inequality, we can identify three major processes of welfare-state restructuring which have together considerably weakened the position of women and black people (see also Williams, 1989) . First, those aspects of welfare policy which reproduce the oppression of women and black people have been intensifiedsuch as community care, immigration controls, and 'law-and-order' policing; second, attempts to challenge these have been weakened through the disempowerment of trade unions, and by the increasingly centralised nature of financial and legislative controls on the actions of local government, and third, the themes of family, nation, and culture have been reworked as a justification for increased privatisation, and the provision of only a minimal safety net of state-provided welfare. We will briefly examine each process in turn.
The moves towards privatisation and commodification of welfare, coupled with a renewed emphasis on self-help and voluntarism, have had substantial implications for race and gender relations, regarding those who provide and consume welfare services. Perhaps most substantial has been the impact of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT), especially on those ancillary services which employ a high percentage of women and black workers. These employees have often seen their pay and their terms and conditions worsen, and it would seem no coincidence that the initial round of CCT was targeted at sectors of employees which were manual, largely female, and in some areas often black (see Coyle, 1985) . Such moves also frequently take public-service employment out of the political arena and into the more immediate sway of private sector managers, whose stress on profit maximisation can enhance racist and sexist practices in the workplace. CCT also affects people as consumers, because tenders for contracts are not allowed to specify a proactive equal-opportunities policy. Thus, addressing the demands of the more marginal groups in society has been made more difficult under the crisis of Fordism.
Customer care and quality assurance initiatives, two other measures of local government attempts to deal with the current crisis, also discriminate in favour of the status quo. They assume the existence of competent, articulate consumer citizens and, although they present an opportunity for the individual identification of user needs, budget restrictions often mean that these are no more than paper promises. In this instance the discourses underpinning the mode of regulation have perhaps been restructured more than the actual institutions.
There has also been an attempt to increase the control and policing of marginal groups, and to redefine their access to welfare. In the general context of a concern about law and order, such groups have been constructed as 'outsiders', threatening the moral and social stability of society. Changes in welfare policy have assisted the definition and stigmatisation of such groups-from the black youth of the early 1980s, through the strikers, scroungers, and homosexuals of the mid-1980s, to the travellers, lone parents, and homeless of the 1990s. Thus, intensified policing of inner cities in the late 1970s and early 1980s, culminating in 'Swamp 81' in Brixton, not only targeted black youths, but had the effect of provoking local responses which led to the riots of 1981. In the wake of subsequent concern over 'street crime', especially 'mugging', juvenile, and disportionately black, 'offenders' were then subject to more repressive penal regimes. People under eighteen have also had their automatic rights to social security and housing benefits withdrawn, and their access to any benefits, with a few limited exceptions such as those for people with children, is dependent upon their accepting a training place on the revised youthtraining programmes. These programmes themselves are now the responsibility of the privatised Training and Enterprise Councils, and as such are more concerned with income, rather than employment, generation. Legislation restricting access to benefits for travellers has also been introduced into Parliament, and a Government White Paper (DoE, 1995) contains proposals to repeal the homelessness provisions introduced in 1977, making access to secure accommodation for the homeless more difficult. The combined effect of these various changes has been fourfold. First, they redefine who is suitable for full welfare provision; second, as a corollary to this, they increase the labeling and definition of 'marginal' groups; third, they redefine the parameters of responsibility between the welfare state and the family; and fourth, they move the emphasis of state intervention from care to control.
These manoeuvres have been helped by the fact that central government has significantly reduced the powers of those institutions which might oppose them. In particular, local authorities which pursued antiracist and antisexist policies of welfare provision have been among those hardest hit by 'rate capping' and subsequent financial controls, thus severely limiting their ability to present alternative scenarios. In addition, in some cases the institutions have simply been abolished, as with the Greater London Council and the other Metropolitan Counties (see Duncan and Goodwin, 1988) , and in others, their powers have been increasingly transferred to the private sector or to centrally appointed agencies (Goodwin, 1992) .
Last, all these moves to redefine and recast welfare provision should be seen against a background of the reworking of the notions of family, culture, and nation. As Williams puts it:
"The welfare state became central to the reconstruction of post-war Britain, ... built with the bricks of the family and the mortar of national unity, by the labour of low paid women and newly arrived black workers. What was crucially different was that, then, the ideology of the traditional family, of national unity and of British culture was used to justify state intervention and a limited form of white male egalitarianism. The use of these ideologies in the 1980s by the New Right has been to justify less state intervention, the supremacy of the market and the existence of inequalities" (1989, page 176). As we pointed out earlier, because of the dynamic nature of the Fordism MSR, the same sets of processes and relations can be beneficial in mediating crisis tendencies at one particular point in time, but less so at others.
We can also identify and interpret three broad responses to the emerging crisis of Fordism within these welfare-state changes. Some are aimed at simply maintaining a system in crisis, and do little to move towards any resolution-immigration controls and welfare discrimination come into this category. Other responses do more to remove forms of regulation which are associated with the crisis of a system, and the increasing privatisation and commodification of welfare seem to be an attempt to roll back what have become dysfunctional forms of state intervention, as do recent attempts to dismantle the system of national pay bargaining for public sector workers. Third, we can identify responses which seek to institute new modes of regulation in order to help secure the conditions for expanded economic growth. The reorientation of vocational training within a workfare context (see Jessop, 1993) can best be interpreted in this light.
Thus, what we are witnessing at the moment in terms of welfare restructuring amounts to a host of different responses to the crisis tendencies of the Fordist MSR in Britain. Whether these responses, material and ideological, add up to a new mode of regulation is doubtful to say the least. To contribute to a new MSR, which following convention we might label post-Fordism, the restructuring of welfare provision would have to help to achieve sustained economic growth and increased social stability. The outlook at present looks bleak on both fronts. It thus seems more helpful to talk of a 'welfare state in limbo', in a liminal period marked by the absence of adequate and effective regulation, rather than speaking of a 'post-Fordisf welfare state, which implies that a new MSR is already present (compare Burrows and Loader, 1994) . What we can say at this stage is that, because the Fordist MSR rested on highly gendered and racialised foundations, any attempt to build a successor will have to redefine the crucial relations of race and gender as well as those of class. As we have seen above, this redefinition has begun, but its finished form is still far from certain and is open to continued challenge and contestation.
